Week 13 Notes:

Plan:
In two parts.
Part 1: Remainder of discussion of the *Science of Logic*
Part 2: One large take-away point about Hegel.
This is his account of how norms are related to actual attitudes—how we should understand 'ought' in terms of 'is', what is specified in deontic normative vocabulary in terms of what is specified in the alethic modal vocabulary of dispositions, laws, and facts.

Both of these parts can be thought of in terms of what Hegel makes of Kant's legacy.
Each develops one of Kants Big Ideas.
Part 1 is developing Kant's idea of **categories**: framework-explicating concepts, which are accordingly graspable *a priori*—in the sense that in using *any* ground-level concepts, one already knows how to do everything one needs to know how to do to deploy the categorial concepts.
Paradigm for me *and for Hegel*, is *logical* concepts: for me, conditional and negation.
Can rehearse my first suggested critical emendation for the case of conditionals codifying endorsement of inferences as good, for some meaning of "good." But there is no end to such dimensions of appraisal of the goodness of inferences.

Part 2 is developing Kant's insight into the *normative* character of intentionality (=discursiveness).
Begin by rehearsing that point: concepts as rules we bind ourselves by, rules that determine what we are committed to or responsible for. Cf. LW on "teach the children a game."
Issue becomes the *Verbindlichkeit*, the *Gültigkeit* of concepts.
How to understand "their grip on us, not our grip on them (adequacy, clarity, distinctness…)."
Understanding *representation* (the genus of intuition/concept) in normative terms: *objectivity* as objective *purport*, being a representation is *answering* for its correctness (being responsible) to what it counts thereby as representing, what exercises authority over it by serving as a standard for such normative assessments.

Part 1

Rehearse highlights of account of how to get from *PG* to *SL*.

[I only got to introduce this point, but not go through everything.
I did include this in last week's notes, though.]

Rehearse:

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel moves beyond the two-stage metacategorial structures of *Verstand/Vernunft* to a *three*-stage picture in which he rehearses, rationally reconstructs, recollects an expressive progression from

  i.   initially crude metacategorial (so, *meta*-metaconceptual) structures (*Sein*, Being), immediacy.

  ii.   through a less crude one (*Schein*, Essence, distinguishing necessity and possibility as the context in which actuality is understood, endorsement as essentially involving the possibility of error, reality/appearance), to

  iii. A final, potentially adequate one: *Begriff*.

Within each of these we find sub-cases, themselves increasing in expressive adequacy.

As is the case with the recollective process that governs determinate empirical and practical, ground-level concepts, the progression through ever-more-expressively-adequate metacategorial discerns each latter stage as unpacking, making explicit some essential feature that is recollected as having been implicit in, presupposed by, the earlier stage.

The *circularity* he emphasizes is because the end of the process show up as identical in content to the starting point: what can now be seen to be *implicit* at the beginning is now made *explicit*. **This is two forms of one content: an *expressive* hylomorphism.**

First critical emendation:

This whole story could be told while withholding endorsement of, and so dividing through by Hegel's commitment to, the claim that **the constellation of metacategories he arrives at** in and as the "science of logic" *is **fully and finally expressively adequate*** to understanding the conceptual content of both all categorial metaconcepts and all possible ground-level empirical and practical concepts.

  Almost everything I have attributed to him concerning the relations between the three levels would still make sense and be defensible if we took it that, like ground-level empirical and practical concepts, the evolution of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts was open-ended and never-ending, subject in principle to indefinite improvement—and so divided through by Hegel's contrary claim.

[Here is the new stuff about *SL*:]

Second critical emendation:

There is a second critical emendation that I recommend, that does *not* leave everything important intact to nearly the same extent, however.

This is to deny that the conceptual content of metaconcepts (including metacategorial meta-metaconcepts) *is* of a piece with the content of ground-level concepts.

The key point, as I see it, is that there is no vocabulary that stands to ground-level empirical and practical vocabulary as that kind of vocabulary stands to the categorial metavocabularies we use to specify the *use*, and *so* the conceptual *contents* (this is force→content semantic pragmatism rather than practical→theoretical stereotypical pragmatism).

The fact that categorial metaconcepts play a distinctive expressive role with respect to the use and content of the concepts for which they *are* metaconcepts gives us another way to think about *their* use and content—a way that is *not* available (by definition) for ground-level concepts. **It gives us another pragmatist route from *use* to *content* (pragmatics to semantics):**
From the use of *one* (base) vocabulary to the content of *another* (meta)vocabulary.

We can understand the use and (so) the content of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts "**from below**," as it were: from what they let us say about the use and content of the concepts whose use and content they explicate.

This "raw material" is different from the *immediacy* that ground-level concepts mediate and so make explicit in that it is already fully conceptualized. It is not *just* playing the functional role of a source of friction and recalcitrance, the source of error and failure in the application of concepts at the *same* level.

It does do that *too*, and that is what makes it possible to see some constellations of metaconceptual categories and metacategories as more expressively adequate than others. And that is what is right about Hegel's continuing to think about the categories and metacategories as elements of recollective expressively progressive discursive traditions.

But unlike ground-level concepts, that is not *all* there is to the use and content of metaconcepts.

And, I want to claim, we can use that expressive surplus, which is the essence of the use and (so) content of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts to understand them.
We also use it to understand the notion of <u>expressive progress</u> that guides recollection of their development. And this, too, has no analogue at the ground level.

The recollective process of retrospectively rationally reconstructing an expressively progressive trajectory through the actual uses of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts *is* still *a* route that takes us from their *use* to their *content*. Again, that is what is right about Hegel's assimilation of all three levels to the same recollective model. But their *use* is crucially *different* from the use of ground-level concepts. And that means that the (meta)conceptual *content* that is further determined and articulated by the recollective process is different, too.

What is common to the two cases is **semantic pragmatism**: content is to be understood in terms of use (force), what one does in applying concepts in judgment *and* intention.

(Contrast this with stereotypical pragmatism: the explanatory priority of the practical over the cognitive.)

Here a key point to realize is that **pragmatism** in *both* is not primacy of practical over theoretical (which is a mere derivative consequence), but explanatory priority of *force* (what one is *doing*) over *content*.

That is, what is *mis*taken as the explanatory priority of *doing* over *knowing* ('pragmatism' in *one* sense) is really the priority of *doing* over the *content* of *both* knowing and doing.

This is 'pragmatism' in *another* sense.

The first is *stereotypical* pragmatism (which may, but need not, take the form of instrumentalism about cognitive norms), the second is *semantic* pragmatism.

Kant and Hegel, I claim, are *semantic* pragmatists, not *stereotypical* pragmatists. I want to say the same about Peirce (semantic), by contrast to James and Dewey (stereotypical).

In *SL*, the *doing* is "rehearsing the moments," that is, *recollection*.

In both cases, we can say that the path from use to content is broadly *functional*.

One looks to the role played by expressions in some *process* or *practice*, the norms that articulate its use in that context.

But how we go from use to content differs in the the two cases.

a) Ground-level: Here the model is that the process that takes us from use (actual applications of concepts) to content (the norms that govern those applications, in the dual sense of providing the normative standards for assessment of the correctness of applications and to which the process is claimed to be subjunctively sensitive) is the two-phase (prospective/retrospective) historically biperspectival experience.

      i. The cycle of cognition-and-action (use) yields commitments that are incompatible by the norms (content) one had understood as governing that use.

This the experience of error-and-failure.

It depends on the *first* sense of "determinate negation": material incompatibility.

It normatively obliges one (going forward) to *change* what one is doing.

      ii. *What* change one makes (the *second* sense of "determinate negation", appropriate to this retrospective phase, and derivative from and dependent on the first) is determined *recollectively*.

Here the process is not that of cognition-and-action (or action-and-cognition).

It is the process of *recollection*.

That is retrospectively rationally reconstructing the past as an expressively progressive *tradition*, turning it into a *history*, resolving prior incompatibilities by making distinctions, reconstructing it as the emergence into explicitness of coherent norms found to have been implicit all along.

      The development of this notion of retrospective recollective rationality is Hegel's particular lasting achievement and glory.

As indicated, Hegel thinks this is the relation between actual *use* and the *norms* articulating conceptual *content* for concepts *generally*: at all three levels.

But I claim (this is the second critical emendation I recommend)**, that the broadly functional pragmatic relation between use and content-articulating norms** (determining what is incompatible with what—the first sense of "determinate negation"—and what is a consequence of what) **is *different* in the case of categorial metaconcepts and metacategorial meta-metaconcepts than it is for ground-level empirical-practical concepts** (the ones applied in the cycle of cognition-and-action or action-and-cognition).
For here the *use* that matters for determining the contents of concepts is *not* the use of that very metavocabulary. It is the use of the *underlying* vocabulary: the vocabulary for which it is a metavocabulary.

Here, too, the relation between use and content is *expressive* or *explicative*.
But the process one is explicating and finding norms governing is not the experience of the cycle of cognition-and-action.
It is the recollective process itself.
What one is making explicit is not the norms governing the use of the very vocabulary whose content one is interested in, but the norms governing the use of the different, prior vocabulary for which the vocabulary in question (categorial or metacategorial) is a metavocabulary.
This sort of explication need *not* be recollective. (Hegel thinks it must.)
As a vocabulary that has conceptual content, it is, of course, subject to development by the experience of errors of application and the recollective rational reconstruction and normative rectification of it. Hegel is right about that.
But he ignores that there is *another* process of extracting norms of assessment to which the use of metavocabularies must be shown to be subjunctively sensitive.
That is the extent to which it gets its subject matter right: the use of the base vocabulary for which it is a metavocabulary.

This distinctive expressive role, this distinctive relation to the use of *another* vocabulary, gives us a further, different handle on the content of metaconcepts, another route for explicating their content.
For in addition to *their* use, they answer also to the use of the base vocabulary.
And it is in *those* terms that I propose to understand the contents categorial metavocabularies and metacategorial meta-metavocabularies, in keeping with the broadly functional, pragmatist explanatory strategy of moving from an account of the *use* of *some* vocabulary to the *content* of *a* vocabulary.
In the the ground-level, base case, the vocabulary whose use determines the conceptual contents of a vocabulary is the same one whose contents are determined.

In the categorial and metacategorial case, it is *also* the use of the vocabulary for which the vocabulary whose content is in question is a metavocabulary.

By exploiting this additional expressive resource, I think we can understand the categorial metaconcepts and metavocabulary without having to recollectively rehearse an expressively progressive trajectory through less adequate versions of them—which is what Hegel does in the bulk of the *Science of Logic*.

There is an alternate explanatory-explicative route, available exclusively for metavocabularies and the metaconcepts they express, in addition to the recollective one that looks only to the use of that very metavocabulary to articulate and explicate the metaconceptual contents it expresses.

<u>Why it matters:</u>

Methodologically, my suggestion so far has been that we *can* understand the content of metacategorial metaconcepts "from below," and so *need* not adopt Hegel's explanatory strategy of articulating and elaborating their content *solely* in terms of the development-by-recollection of the *use* of *those* concepts. We can *also* understand it in terms of how and what it has the expressive power to make explicit about the use of categorial and ground-level concepts.

But I am inclined to endorse a stronger claim, concerning not the *sufficiency* of an account metacategorial conceptual content from below, but the *necessity* of it.

That is, I am inclined to think that any story that does *not* include an account of the expressive resources of metacategories and categories relative to the use of the concepts for which they are meta-concepts and meta-metaconcepts is inadequate on the face of it. The expressively progressive recollected "science of logic" *must* address the respects in which later metavocabularies are *more expressively adequate* to the use of the vocabularies for which they are metavocabularies. The idea that that could be done *solely* at the meta-categorial and metaconceptual level is a fantasy—albeit a seductive one.

The considerations advanced here are corrosive of Hegel's project in the *Science of Logic* because they throw into doubt the possibility, the ultimate intelligibility, of articulating and elaborating the content of metacategorial concepts by staying entirely at the level of *their* use, *without* consideration of the use of concepts *below* them. That threatens the otherwise inspiring vision of "pure thought thinking itself" and "God's thoughts before the creation."

In the end, this is the issue I think we should focus on in assessing the prospects for a "science of logic" in Hegel's sense.

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Note that this story:
i. Retains the **semantic pragmatism** that seeks a broadly functionalist explanatory strategy for moving from use or force to content, from what is actually done to the norms that govern it in a dual deontic/alethic sense.

(By contrast to a stereotypical Fichtean pragmatism that consists in the explanatory priority of the practical over the cognitive.)

ii. Retains a role at both levels for recollective rationality, and so permits the understanding of the historical sense of "**determinate negation**" (of a later stage in the development-by-determination relative to an earlier one) built on the sense of "determinate negation" that matters for the *first* phase of experience, the experience of cognitive error and practical failure.

Determinate Negation:

Dual sense of "determinate negation" already in the *Phenomenology*:

i)   As material incompatibility.

ii)   As the relation the product of recollection stands in to what is recollected: it is *different* from what is recollected, but also *expresses* it. It is a negation of it, but not a bare or formal one. It is a *determinate* negation. It is what the recollected material becomes when it is further *determined*, which involves *changing* (negating) it.

These two, in their difference and relation, are the origin of the two senses of "science of logic": as the **process** that is the application of the method, and as the ultimate **result** of that process. (That there *is* an *ultimate* result assumes H's view about the *finality* of metametaconcepts = metacategories, which my critical reading denies in its first suggested emendation. But that later stages in the temporally biperspectival process of experience are in this sense "determinate negations" of the earlier, less expressively adequate stages, does not.)

In suggesting this second emendation, I am breaking with Hegel more decisively than in the first case.

And further, this is a break that takes us back in Kant's direction ("**Zurück nach Kant**!").

For Kant had seen a fundamental difference in the expressive role of ground-level empirical and practical concepts and categorial metaconcepts.

He rigorously kept separate sets of books on them.

Synthesizing a manifold of sensuous intuition into a constellation of concepts-and-commitments that exhibit the rational unity distinctive of apperception is quite a different expressive role from making explicit the forms of judgment and so the transcendental conditions of experience.

By abstracting from Kant's notion of <u>intuition</u>, and construing his successor conception of <u>immediacy</u> *much* more broadly, *purely* in terms of the role immediacy plays in the process of mediating it, Hegel in the *SL* is able to assimilate the expressive roles of both kinds of concept, as well as the third level of metacategorial meta-metaconcepts that he adds on.

The result he announces we have arrived at by the end of the *SL*, "pure thought thinking itself," "God's thoughts before the creation," is a *top-down* order of explanation, with lower-level concepts and metaconcepts understood functionally in terms of the role they play in the development of higher-level ones.

In recommending a converse, *bottom-up* explanatory strategy (which I see as already helpful in understanding the *PG*, under the rubric of the hermeneutic method of "semantic descent") I am endorsing the Kantian distinction of expressive roles.

This is a fundamental way in which my reading of Hegel is Kantian.
(Of course, my reading of Kant is noticeably Hegelian, too.)
This is built-in and explicitly avowed.

In this regard it is different from **the charge**—which has not explicitly been put this way yet by my critics, but which seems to me to be implicit in the dissatisfactions some have expressed—that my reading of the *Phenomenology* amounts to **reconstructing Hegelian metacategories of *Vernunft* using only the resources of Kantian metacategories of *Verstand*.**

Hegel: "**On he who looks rationally on the world, the world looks rationally back.**"
"Looking rationally on the world" is acknowledging the magnanimous, forgiving, ultimately recognitive commitment to tell a recollective story that discerns a norm in actual applications of vocabulary—a norm that is *rationally* binding, in the sense that it articulates the content of a concept that determines what is a reason for what. Finding such a norm is "the world looking rationally back."

1. **Analysis of last 7 'graphs of the _Science of Logic_:**

(1) is introductory and (7) conclusory. So the meat is the 4 'graphs, (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6).

1. Consequently, just as the absence of content in the above beginnings does not make them absolute beginnings, so too it is not the content as such that could lead the method into the infinite progress forwards or backwards. From one aspect, the _determinateness_ which the method creates for itself in its result is the moment by means of which the method is self-mediation and converts _the immediate beginning into something mediated._ But conversely, it is through the determinateness that this mediation of the method runs its course; it returns _through_ a _content_ as through an apparent _other_ of itself to its beginning in such a manner that not only does it restore that beginning-as a _determinate_ beginning however-but the result is no less the sublated determinateness, and so too the restoration of the first immediacy in which it began. This it accomplishes as _a system of totality._ We have still to consider it in this determination.

Read for determinate concepts:
The beginning of a phase of experience (method) is something immediate, paradigmatically some objective environing situation sensuously revealed in noninferentially acquired states one finds oneself with.
The process in question **"converts the immediate beginning into something mediated"** by first making explicit the concepts that have been implicitly applied in becoming aware of what are in fact judgements.
This is "the determinateness which the method creates for itself in its result."
Further phases unpack what is implicit in those concepts.
The "return" is the recollection, which, at the end of many cycles of experience (including actions) _recollects_ the process, as the further _determining_ of the content of the judgments and of the concepts applied.
This is the "return through a content to its beginning that restores it."
The end is the beginning recollected, as having been all along implicit.
For the first time, at the end, looking back, we understand the immediacy with which we began.

Read for (meta-)metaconcepts:
The beginning is a metaconception of the conceptual we just find ourselves with, naively.
It is in this sense "immediate."
The process in question "converts the immediate beginning into something mediated" by first making explicit the metaconcepts that have been implicitly applied in becoming aware of our conceptual activity at the ground level.

Further phases unpack what is implicit in those metaconcepts.

The "return" is the recollection, which, at the end of many cycles of applying the method, *recollects* the process.

The result is an expressively adequate set of meta-metaconcepts, which are now both the product of the methodological process and are recollected as having been all along implicit in the first crude understandings of concept-use.

For the first time, at the end, looking back, we understand the immediacy with which we began.

2. [Now we look more closely at this process ("We have still to consider it in this determination.")]:

We have shown that ==the determinateness which was a result is itself==, by virtue of the form of simplicity into which it has withdrawn, ==a fresh beginning==; ==as this beginning is distinguished from its predecessor precisely by that determinateness, cognition rolls onwards from content to content==. First of all, this advance is determined as beginning from simple determinatenesses, ==the succeeding ones becoming ever *richer and more coucrete*==. For ==the result contains its beginning and its course has enriched it by a fresh determinateness.== The *universal* constitutes the foundation ; the advance is therefore not to be taken as a *flowing* from one *other* to the next *other* .==In the absolute method the Notion *maintains* itself in its otherness, the universal in its particularization==, in judgement and reality; ==at each stage of its further determination it raises the entire mass of its preceding content==, and by its dialectical advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind, but ==carries along with it all it has gained, and inwardly enriches and consolidates itself.==

3. ==This *expansion* may be regarded as the moment of content==, and in the whole as the first premiss; the universal is *communicated* to the wealth of content, immediately maintained in it. But the relationship has also its second, negative or dialectical side. The enrichment proceeds in the *necessity* of the Notion, it is held by it, and each determination is a reflection-into-self. ==Each new stage of *forthgoing*==, that is, of ==*further determination*==, is also a ==withdrawal== inwards, and the greater *extension* is equally a *higher intensity.* The richest is therefore the most concrete and most *subjective,* and that which withdraws itself into the simplest depth is the mightiest and most all-embracing. The highest, most concentrated point is the *pure personality* which, solely through the absolute dialectic which is its nature, no less *embraces and holds everything within itself,* because it makes itself the supremely free—the simplicity which is the first immediacy and universality.

Read for determinate concepts *and* (meta-)metaconcepts:

The process proceeds in phases.

The end of each phase is the beginning of the next.

Regarded *pro*spectively, it is a process of *adding* determination, *making* the concepts *more* determinate, and in that sense further *determining* them.

Regarded *retro*spectively (recollectively), it is a process of *unpacking* and *expressing* what is immediately there in the beginning, making *explicit* (for us) what is recollectively revealed as having been all along *implicit* (an sich) in it.

Retrospectively, it is a *finding* of determinate content as already there, richer than the crude first appearance of it to us. This is "determining" as "finding out."

Prospectively, it is driven by finding *errors* or *failures* in the previous conception, now revealed as crude and inadequate.

"Each new stage of *forthgoing*, that is, of *further determination* [making more determinate] is also a withdrawal inwards…" a matter of finding out (determining) what was "inside" (implicit in) the content already crudely presented.

"The highest, most concentrated point is the *pure personality* which, solely through the absolute dialectic which is its nature, no less *embraces and holds everything within itself,* because it makes itself the supremely free—the simplicity which is the first immediacy and universality"

At the meta-metalevel, this process is called "absolute dialectic."

As the recollector, it both makes and finds rationality (=freedom), unpacking any immediate self-consciousness (constellation of metaconcepts) to arrive at the same final self-understanding, which accordingly shows up as implicit, and hence there to be found, everywhere.

4. It is in this manner that each step of the *advance* in the process of further determination, while getting further away from the indeterminate beginning is also *getting back nearer to it,* and that therefore, what at first sight may appear to be different, the retrogressive grounding of the beginning, and the *progressive further determining* of it, coincide and are the same. The method, which thus winds itself into a circle, cannot anticipate its development in time that the beginning is, as such, already something derived ; it is sufficient for the beginning in its immediacy that it is simple universality. In being that, it has its complete condition; and there is no need to deprecate the fact that it may only be accepted *provisionally* and *hypothetically.* Whatever objections to it might be raised-say, the limitations of human knowledge, the need to examine critically the instrument of cognition before starting to deal with the subject matter-are themselves *presuppositions,* which as *concrete determinations* involve the demand for their mediation and proof. Since therefore they possess no formal advantage over the *beginning* with the subject matter against which they protest, but on the contrary themselves require deduction on account of their more concrete content, their claim to prior consideration must be treated as an empty presumption. They have an untrue content, for they convert what we know to be finite and untrue into something incontestable and absolute, namely, a *limited* cognition determined as *form* and *instrument relatively to its content;* this untrue cognition is itself also the form, the process of seeking grounds, that is retrogressive. The method of truth, too, knows the beginning to be incomplete, because it is a beginning ; but at the same time it knows this incompleteness to be a necessity , because truth only comes to be itself through the negativity of immediacy. The impatience that insists *merely* on getting beyond the *determinate—whether* called beginning, object, the finite, or in whatever other form it be taken-and finding itself immediately in the absolute, has before it as cognition nothing but the empty negative, the abstract infinite; in other words,

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a *presumed* absolute, that is presumed because it is not *posited,* not *grasped;* grasped it can only be through the *mediation* of cognition, of which the universal and immediate is a moment, but the truth itself resides only in the extended course of the process and in the conclusion. To meet the subjective needs of unfamiliarity and its impatience, a survey of the *whole* may of course be given *in advance-by* a division for reflection which, after the manner of finite cognition, specifies the particular of the universal as something *already there* and to be awaited in the course of the science. Yet this affords us nothing more than a picture for *ordinary thinking* ; for ==the genuine transition from the universal to the particular and to the whole that is determined in and for itself, in which whole that first universal itself according to its true determination is again a moment, is alien to the above manner of division, and is alone the mediation of the science itself==.

5. By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, ==the science exhibits itself as a *circle* returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation== ; this circle is moreover a *circle of circles,* for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member. Links of this chain are the individual sciences [of logic, nature and spirit], each of which has an *antecedent* and a *successor-or,* expressed more accurately, *has* only the *antecedent* and *indicates* its *successor* in its conclusion.

BB:

a) I think that the "individual sciences" that are the "links in the chain" that is the process of developing more and more expressively adequate logical metaconcepts are the intermediate stages of that process. Grossly, they are the conceptual understood according to categories with the metacategorial structure of Being, Essence, and Concept. At a finer grain, they are the different (ever more adequate) forms those metacategorial structures can take. It is these that "have" their antecedent—the less expressively adequate metaconceptions from which they develop, by articulating and making explicit its presuppositions—and "indicate" their successors, pointing the way to still more expressively powerful and adequate metaconceptions.
These are the smaller circles within the large circle.

b) The overall conceit here (in the rhetorical sense of "conceit") is that the shape of the overall story of the *Science of Logic* is itself a circle.
By this he means, in general, that at the end we see that the result of the expressive development of metaconcepts (for which conceptions such as Being, Essence, and Concept are meta-metaconceptions) has been a set of meta-metaconcepts that are adequate not only as metaconcepts for ordinary, determinate concepts, but for making explicit the expressive virtues and vices of *logical* categorial metaconcepts, too.
They are fully expressively adequate *meta*-metaconcepts. That is what we achieve at the end of the *Science of Logic*.

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They are concerned with nothing outside the conceptual, and in this sense are purely self-regarding. They are the organ of finally adequate conceptual self-conception, so self-consciousness, not now by *individuals* but (though applied only by individuals, so the self-consciousness in question is exercised only by individuals), in a sense by the conceptual itself. They are the conceptual organ by which the Idea understands itself. Expressively adequate metaconcepts turn out to be expressively adequate meta-metaconcepts: categories that are metacategories.

Compare: Frege in the *Begriffsschrift*. He introduces the BGS to make explicit the inferential roles of ordinary concepts. But doing *logic* is showing that it can make explicit the inferential roles of those explicitating *logical* concepts.

c) So the question is: In what sense is achieving this result a "return" to the beginning of the application of method in the *Science of Logic* (the book, not the conceptual system that results by the end of the process it recounts)?
Is there more to this claim than just (!) that the end result has been shown to be, is recollected as, having been all along implicit in the starting-point of the expressively progressive process of developing ever more expressively powerful and adequate meta(meta)concepts?
That is the expressive, hermeneutic circle described by any successful recollection, insofar as it is successful.

It *seems* that he wants to see something more: a kind of identity of *form* of the starting-point and the endpoint. Each is a kind of *identity*. Being as *bare*, *immediate* identity, and the science of logic as

   i)   *An* identity that is a thoroughly *mediated* identity, that is also
   ii)   *That* identity that the meta-metaconcepts of Being, and even their crudest initial form.

The justification for (ii) is then that the fully articulated self-applying, self-understanding final science of logic has been shown to have been already implicit in the very crudest meta-metaconcepts.

If that is how the trope of the *Science of Logic* as describing a circle works, I find it weak, insofar as it goes beyond understanding the recollecting conception as having been implicit in, and in that sense identical with, the recollected beginning (and all the intermediate stages, too).

6. Thus then logic, too, in the absolute Idea, has withdrawn into that same simple unity which its beginning is; the pure immediacy of being in which at first every determination appears to be extinguished or removed by abstraction, is the Idea that has reached through mediation, that is, through the sublation of mediation, a likeness correspondent to itself. The method is the pure Notion that relates itself only to itself; it is therefore the *simple self-relation* that is *being*. But now it is also *fulfilled being*, the *Notion that*

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comprehends itself, being as the *concrete* and also absolutely *intensive* totality. In conclusion, there remains only this to be said about this Idea, that in it, first, the *science of logic* has grasped its own Notion. In the sphere of *being,* the beginning of its *content,* its Notion appears as a knowing in a subjective reflection external to that content. But in the Idea of absolute cognition the Notion has become the Idea's own content. The Idea is itself the pure Notion that has itself for subject matter and which, in running itself as subject matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science [of logic], and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby superseding its standing as content and subject matter and cognizing the Notion of the science. Secondly, this Idea is still logical, it is enclosed within pure thought, and is the science only of the divine *Notion.* True, the systematic exposition is itself a realization of the Idea but confined within the same sphere. Because the pure Idea of cognition is so far confined within subjectivity, it is the *urge* to sublate this, and pure truth as the last result becomes also the *beginning of another sphere and science.* It only remains here to indicate this transition.

BB: "this transition" is the transition from:
   i)   The science of logic as *process*, as *method*, as itself developing from expressively poorer metaconcepts to expressively richer metaconcepts, to
   ii)   The science of logic as the finally achieved constellation of fully expressively adequate metaconcepts. This is the outcome of applying the method, of following out the development of logical metaconcepts to the end.
(ii) is discussed in the final 'graph, below.
It is "cognizing the Notion of the science," that is, systematically articulating the *Begriff* that articulates conceptual contentfulness as such.

   7. The Idea, namely, in positing itself as absolute *unity* of the pure Notion and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of *being,* is the *totality* in this *form: nature.* But this determination has not *issued from a process* of *becoming,* nor is it a *transition,* as when above, the subjective Notion in its totality *becomes objectivity,* and the *subjective end becomes life.* On the contrary, the pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the Notion is itself raised into Notion, is an absolute *liberation* for which there is no longer any immediate determination that is not equally *posited* and itself Notion; in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place; the simple being to which the Idea determines itself remains perfectly transparent to it and is the Notion that, in its determination, abides with itself. The passage is therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea *freely releases* itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise. By reason of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is also utterly free-the *externality of space and time* existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity. In so far as this externality presents itself only in the abstract immediacy

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of being and is apprehended from the standpoint of consciousness, it exists as mere objectivity and external life; but in the Idea it remains essentially and actually [*an und fur sich]* the totality of the Notion, and science in the relationship to nature of divine cognition. But in this next resolve of the pure Idea to determine itself as external Idea, it thereby <mark>only</mark> posits f<mark>or itself the mediation</mark> <mark>out of which the Notion ascends as a free Existence that has withdrawn into itself from externality</mark>, that completes its self-liberation in the *science of spirit,* and that finds the supreme Notion of itself in <mark>the science of logic as the self-comprehending pure Notion</mark>.

BB: The Idea is, by definition, the "absolute unity" ("absolute" means "indissoluble") of *Begriff* and its reality. This is *bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism.* The Idea understands conceptual articulation as a unity that has two aspects: subjective and objective. If we abstract away the objective side, we get nature.
Nature is the source of the *process* of *determination* and (so) the *determination* of *content*. But "the form of its determinateness is also utterly free-the *externality of space and time* existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity."
That is, nature is not reference-dependent on the activities or processes of subjectivity, knowing of and acting on it.
The "absolute unity" of the two forms of conceptual content ensures that we cannot *understand* nature apart from understanding subjective activity. That is sense-dependence, dependence in the order of understanding, not being.
All this is *objective idealism.*
"in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place; the simple being to which the Idea determines itself remains perfectly transparent to it and <mark>is the Notion that, in its determination, abides with itself</mark>. The passage is therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea *freely releases* itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise. By reason of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is also utterly free-"
BB: The "free release" of its aspect of objectivity by the Idea is the thought that acknowledging the moment of independence (authority, exercised in determining/determination of conceptual content) of the objective pole in no way threatens the "absolute unity" that consists in the identity of *form* of its objective and subjective poles.

The idea as *cognition* is its relation to the moment of *independence* of the objective pole: its authority over subjective processes.
The idea as *the good* is its relation to the moment of *dependence* of the objective pole: the authority of subjectivity over objectivity in intentional action, directed towards a practical end endorsed by the individual subject.

The third perspective is the perspective of the science of logic.

It is concerned *only* with the *Begriff*: the *conceptual form* common to the objective and subjective aspects of the Idea.

This is the deployment of *meta*concepts adequate to comprehend the conceptual form of both aspects: conceptual form as such, necessarily comprising *both* aspects.

This is the categorial, speculative, philosophical, logical metaconcepts used to make explicit the nature of the conceptual itself.

This is the "self-comprehending pure Notion."

Part 2:

Particularly in the summing-up with which I am ending the course, I am presenting things in the form of an alternate structure and expository strategy for the material of *ASoT*.

Last week, and finishing up that line of thought with the first part of my remarks today, I am offering suggestions as to how one might go forward from the reading of the *Phenomenology* that book expounds to begin thinking about the project of the *Science of Logic*.

I don't try to do that in *A Spirit of Trust*.

It is an unwritten concluding chapter, envisaged but not implemented in the final text.

And in this second part of my presentation today, I want to connect what I take Hegel's biggest and most important philosophical ideas and contributions to be to a contemporary philosophical issue that I take to be of on-going interest: the skeptical threat to the intelligibility of semantics that Kripke finds in the later Wittgenstein.

At one point, I considered using Hegel's response to this challenge as the framing narrative of my whole reading of the *Phenomenology*. As it is, the connection is made in the *Conclusion* of the book, but it is not used to frame or orient the whole discussion.

Kant's discovery of discursive **normativity**:

And in this concluding session, I want to foreground one theme, which, while explicit in the Conclusion is not presented as something like the central philosophical lesson of my reading of Hegel—as I will here.

This is Hegel's development of Kant's insight into the essentially *normative* character of discursive practice.

Jerry Schneewind offers a crucial survey of the antecedents in earlier Modern philosophical thought of Kant's notion of autonomy. And in what I called "the missing chapter" (thought of as Chapter Nine) in my discussion of Hegel's *Self-Consciousness* chapter, I retrace some of Schneewind's steps with the aim of displaying rather what Hegel took from those preceding

discussions, the in many ways quite different use he made of and lessons he learned from those intellectual antecedents.

But to my mind, Schneewind misses an absolutely crucial feature of Kant's revolutionary reconception of normativity. For he thinks of it and addresses it exclusively as a feature of Kant's *practical* philosophy.

What he misses in rehearsing what Kant took from the tradition of jurisprudential thought and moral philosophy he inherited is that Kant broadened the topic substantially from the way it was conceived by his forebears.

Kant saw the considerations he assembled as **addressing the normativity of discursiveness in general**, not just on the side of our understanding of practical agency, but also on the side of our understanding of theoretical cognition.

He took the insight into the essentially normative character of thought in general to have been implicitly acknowledged by all his Enlightenment predecessors, under the hazy but capacious heading of their thinking about the role of "reason." The "**light of reason**" was always conceived as **normatively significant**, in the sense of bearing on what *ought* to *think* as well as what one ought to *do*—even if people were hazy about just how this worked.

Kant's recollective rational reconstruction of his tradition sought to make explicit this implicit insight into the normative character of reason as such, which he saw as active in it.

His key reconceptualization of the conceptual ("discursive" for Kant just means "of or pertaining to concepts") in terms of concepts understood as *rules*, his explicit problematizing of the nature of the normative "bindingness" or "validity" (*Verbindlichkeit, Gültigkeit*) of those rules, and his understanding of the genus of the two species into which he had synthesized his Rationalist and Empiricist predecessors' confused talk about "ideas" in terms of representation, itself understood in normative terms of the authority of representeds over the correctness of representings, the responsibility of representings to what they count as representing just in virtue of acknowledging that authority, all served to articulate his new vision.

In doing that he subsumed the relations between mind and world in empirical cognition no less than in intentional action under the relations between 'ought' and 'is'.

In doing so, as I have pointed out before, Kant courted the danger of his principal orienting *distinction* turning into a corrosive *dualism*.

As I use the terms, a distinction becomes a dualism when it is drawn in terms that make the relations between the distinguished items unintelligible.

Fred Beiser has argued with some force that Kant's nineteenth century neo-Kantian heirs, who were distinguished by their appreciation of his normative turn, ultimately were unable to deal with and eventually succumbed to just this danger.

This is the background against which Hegel makes what I see as his central philosophical contribution in the *Phenomenology*.

That is his ***naturalizing*** (in a suitably broad, nonreductive sense) of normativity, along two dimensions, by ***socializing*** it, construing normative statuses and at base social statuses, synthesized by reciprocal recognition, and ***historicizing*** it, in the form of his distinctive, radically original conception of recollective rationality.

As I understand him, the two come together into a new moral vision of recognition as recollection.

But I want to close the course by saying something about how this achievement looks from the standpoint of one set of contemporary philosophical concerns: those raised by Wittgenstein and popularized by Kripke in the 1980s following the publication of his undergraduate honors thesis.

For it is here that I think we can see most clearly the relevance and significance of Hegel's contributions to philosophical issues of urgent current concern.

Social dimension of relation of normative attitudes and normative statuses:

In Hegel's terms, the problematic inherited from Kant becomes how to understand the *bindingess* of norms once we understand them to be ***socially instituted*** **by the** *attitudes* **practitioners actually adopt.**

(You can throw in their dispositions, if you like. They are specified in ***alethic*** **modal** terms of subjunctive robustness, and the issue is how to get from there to underwrite ***deontic*** **normative**

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notions of authority and responsibility: the two sides of bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism.)

In the terms I have recommended and employed, this is the question of **how to understand the *status-dependence of normative attitudes*, in the light of appreciating the *attitude-dependence of normative statuses***.

Recall that on the side of subjects, I read Hegel's talk of dependence and independence in terms of responsibility and authority.

Hegel's idea about the *social* character of normativity takes off from the Enlightenment thought that it makes no sense to talk about deontic normative statuses of responsibility and authority apart from attitudes of *holding* someone responsible and *attributing* or acknowledging their authority.

And his basic idea is that one's own attitude of *taking* responsibility is successful in *making* one responsible, that is, in instituting an actual *status* of responsibility, just in case others concur, that is accept your attitude and *hold* you responsible, that is adopt attitudes of *taking* you to be responsible.

But who is it whose complementary attitudes are needed to actualize the status that is the virtual object of your original attitude of undertaking a responsibility (committing yourself)?

One might at this point invoke a pre-existent *community*.

But community in this sense is itself a normative notion.

Hegel goes another way (what in *MIE* I call 'I'/ 'thou' sociality rather than 'I'/ 'we' sociality).

Those whose recognition of one's status is constitutive if it suitably complements one's own petition for recognition is just those one *authorizes* to do so, those in whom one *invests* that authority by constitutively recognizing it in turn.

The result is his notion of *reciprocal* recognition, (*gegenseitig Anerkennung*):

A genuine normative status is instituted by one's own attitudes just when one is recognized as having that status by those one recognizes.

As a template for an account of how we can *collectively* lift ourselves up by our own bootstraps and institute genuine normative statuses by our attitudes, I think this is brilliant.

It has a theoretical structure one can work with.

(Compare Wittgenstein's vague talk about norms being features of social practices or "customs, uses, institutions.")

Further, norms understood like this come with a mechanism for administering them: for appealing to them in assessing whether one has fulfilled one's responsibility and whether one was entitled to the authority one claimed.

Historical dimension of relation of normative attitudes and normative statuses:

Hegel combines this idea of the essentially *social* character of norms with another:
the idea of their essentially *historical* character.

Here the basic underlying idea is similarly simple.
We can reconcile the idea that normative statuses exercise *authority* over normative attitudes, by providing standards for their assessment as correct, with the idea that those very statuses are *instituted* by normative attitudes if we take seriously the idea that the communities (social "substance" in Hegel's terminology) that are synthesized by reciprocal recognition are temporally extended.
For then **we can understand norms instituted by the *past* attitudes of practitioners as binding or governing the attitudes of *present* practitioners**.

     We still institute the norms *we* are bound by—as required by the idea of autonomy as being bound by laws one has laid down for oneself that Kant took over from Rousseau (turning a definition of *freedom* into a criterion of demarcation for genuinely *normative* constraint).
But norms are now understood as the mediating mechanism by which the attitudes of *past* practitioners *bind* the attitudes of *present* practitioners, by providing standards for the assessment of their correctness.

A very flat-footed version of this idea understands the division between the actual activity that *institutes* norms and the activity that *applies* or is subject to (bound by) those norms as distinct and sequential.
The legislator, Solon, lays down the laws, and subsequent generations are bound by them.

Or, as with Carnap, *first* one picks a *language*, settles the *meanings* of one's terms, and *then* one applies them to characterize what is actual and possible, formulating a *theory*, forming one's *beliefs*.

But Quine rightly objects to Carnap that this picture is drawn from and appropriate to *artificial* languages such as logistical calculi, whose meanings are stipulated in a more expressively powerful metalanguage.

In natural language, all there is is the *use* of the language, the making and defending of claims, which must be intelligible at once as *instituting* meanings *and* as *applying* them (correctly or incorrectly, according to the meanings).

Hegel accordingly sees the process of instituting norms *by* the attitudes we actually adopt and that of applying them *to* the attitudes we actually adopt (as normative standards of assessment to which they are required to be subjunctively sensitive) as two sides of one coin, or more properly as two aspects of or perspectives on *one* process.

At every point in an extended process (practice), *both* things are going on: further determination of the norm (corresponding to institution of norms) and acknowledgment of the authority of the norm as inherited (corresponding to the application of norms).

This is where I have found it useful to invoke the **jurisprudential model** of judges working in common or case law.

Every decision they make (the official attitudes they adopt) should be understood **both** **as** *applying* previously settled law, norms that *bind* it in the sense of providing standards for the *correctness* of that decision**, *and* as *instituting*** the law that will be inherited by their successors.

Common and case law are properly understood as "judge-made law," *and* judges are properly understood as *rationally bound* by the norms instituted by the precedents they inherit.

- Regarded *pro*spectively, they are making the law, instituting the norm, exercising their authority. After all, there is nothing but their activity to do so.
- Regarded *retro*spectively, they are bound by the law, applying the norm, acknowledging their responsibility.

Without appealing to this particular model, Hegel understood that **this *historical* structure of authority and responsibility could make sense of both the attitude-dependence of normative statuses and the status-dependence of normative attitudes**.

And he saw that at its heart is a hitherto-untheorized notion of rationality:

recollective **rationality**.

It is a kind of *rationalization* that is at once a *making* rational and a *finding* to be rational.

It is why, in his slogan:

"On he who looks on the world rationally, the world looks rationally back."

Recollective rationality is the rationally reconstructing a *past* into a history, giving it the distinctive structure of authority and responsibility characteristic of a *tradition*, by discerning in past actual attitudes (applications) a trajectory that is *expressively progressive*.

This is giving it the shape of the gradual emergence into explicitness of norms that are recollected as having been all along implicitly acknowledged in the attitudes adopted: both serving as a standard for assessing their correctness and showing up as something to which they were subjunctively sensitive.

Wittgenstein, Kripke, and "the rule-following considerations":

And this is Hegel's detailed, systematic answer to the question Kripke rightly sees Wittgenstein as asking:

If all there is to institute conceptual norms is our use of the vocabulary that expresses them, how can we understand that use as genuinely *bound* by those norms, going forward?

Here is a characterization of that contemporary problematic, which I hope you can see as asking the very question I claim Hegel is answering.

[On Kripkenstein, "the rule-following considerations," and Genealogical Alienation from Norms From *ASoT Conclusion*]

Claim: The skeptical arguments about semantic norms that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein are expressions of alienation in Hegel's sense. But in fact Kripke's Wittgenstein's argument essentially consists in **the confrontation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes with the attitude-dependence of normative statuses**, drawing the conclusion that the latter makes the former unintelligible.

1.   Kripke begins with what is in fact a Kantian insight: applying a concept has *normative* consequences.[1] Meaning <u>plus</u> by "+" includes undertaking *commitments* as to how it would be correct to apply the expression in cases beyond those in which I actually apply it.

In the language I have been using to articulate Hegel's views, adopting a determinately contentful *attitude*, for instance acquiring a belief or forming an intention, is undertaking (or attributing) a normative *status*. The commitment undertaken, the status acquired by using the expression, is significant for assessments of the *correctness* of future applications. That status is a commitment or responsibility that one undertakes. Having such a status is subjecting oneself to a norm, in the sense of making oneself liable to assessments of the correctness of one's attitudes, according to the standard set by the norm.

The *content* of the normative status (here, belief or intention) determines *what* norm one makes oneself liable to by acquiring that status, by adopting an attitude that is the undertaking of that status. The content of the commitment (e.g. the concept <u>plus</u>) is the standard according to which attitudes expressed using "+" are to be assessed.

In other words, the determinate contentfulness of normative attitudes is intelligible only in terms of the authority that normative statuses (the commitments one undertakes in expressing a belief or forming an intention using "+") have over those attitudes.

This is **the status-dependence of normative attitudes**.

The observation that sets the stage for Kripke's Wittgenstein's argument is that **the determinate contentfulness of normative attitudes** is intelligible only insofar as they are understood as **responsible to norms**, that is, insofar as **normative statuses** in the form of the commitments one undertakes by believing or intending, **are authoritative** with respect to assessments of the correctness or success of the attitudes in question.

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[1] In *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* [Harvard University Press, 1982].

2. The second step in setting up the skeptical argument directed against the criterion of adequacy of making sense of the status-dependence of normative attitudes then appeals to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses.

We can ask: "What is the source of the norms that set standards for assessments of correctness of the attitudes that are applications of concepts such as plus?"

Kripke's Wittgenstein's second claim is that **only the *use* of the expression can confer that content** on it.

All there is to determine the content of the concept applied, and so the norm that governs applications of it (in the sense of providing a standard of normative assessments of correctness for those applications) is the way it has been applied, the attitudes that have in fact been adopted. So the question becomes: "What fact is it about the use of the expression '+' in virtue of which it means plus?"   The use of the expression consists in adopting attitudes expressed by means of it: undertaking and attributing commitments, whether theoretical, in the form of beliefs, or practical, in the form of intentions.

So the challenge becomes explaining how the adoption of a sequence of prior attitudes can determine a norm governing which possible future applications would be correct.

How are we to understand those **attitudes as exercising the appropriate authority to institute** determinately contentful normative statuses—t**he attitude-dependence of those statuses**?

3. The third move in the argument is then the claim that there is no way to explain how any course of past actual applications of a concept can determine a normative standard for assessing the correctness of novel possible future uses.

How is such a **passage from an 'is' to an 'ought'** to be justified?

Past usage consists of a finite number of candidate cases where the term was in fact applied, and a finite number of candidate cases where its application was withheld. How is that supposed to determine how it would be *correct* to apply (or withhold application of) the concept in an infinite number of future cases?

What gives those past applications **binding normative force** over future ones?

Here, though tempting, it is no help to appeal not only to *actual* applications, but to *dispositions* to apply the concept. For such dispositions will not underwrite a notion of mistaken application robust enough to make sense of the idea that one might be disposed to make mistakes.

As Wittgenstein says, if whatever seems right to me is right, then there can be no question of right or wrong.[2]

Further, even if we can tell a story about the origin of normative force in non-normative matters of fact—the attitudes that have actually been adopted—and so justify a transition from 'is' to 'ought', the question will still remain: *which* ought, which determinately contentful norm, of all the ones *compatible with* the actual prior applications, should be taken to be instituted thereby? For there are *many* ways to "go on in the same way" as the prior applications, and for any of them a story can be told about why it is the right one.

And it seems that appealing to definitional or inferential connections to other concepts—defining addition in terms of counting, plus in terms of successor—merely puts off the issue, since the same sort of question can be raised about the institution or the determinate contents of *those* conceptual norms by prior applications of them.

Conclusion of argument:

The conclusion is that if we accept that all there is to institute a conceptual norm is prior uses of the concept, then it is hard to see how such uses can institute a norm that is sufficiently determinate to serve as a standard of correctness for an indefinite number of further possible uses.

That is, **accepting the attitude-dependence of normative statuses seems to rule out the authority of those attitude-instituted norms over further attitudes: the status-dependence of normative attitudes**.

In gesturing at the familiar argument of Kripke's Wittgenstein, I am ignoring a host of subtleties, because I am only after one conclusion: the argument is a paradigm case of the **alienation** Hegel diagnoses as the worm in the apple of modernity.

It is a particularly important contemporary philosophical manifestation of that alienation, since it directly addresses the issue of how to understand determinately contentful conceptual norms, and it is one of the master ideas of the reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology* that I have been offering here that this topic is at the core of the book.

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[2] *Philosophical Investigations* §258.

It is part of that claim that in 1806 Hegel already foresaw the problem that Kripke's Wittgenstein raises. It is accordingly a principal criterion of adequacy of the account I attribute to him of how to overcome alienation and reconcile a *sittlich* appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes with a modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses that it provide a pointed and powerful response to Kripke's Wittgenstein's skeptical semantic challenge.

The account Hegel offers splits the difference between what Kripke calls "straight" and "skeptical" solutions to the problem. It is like the straight solutions in that it explains what is required for claims about what someone means and what the determinate content of their normative statuses and attitudes is to be *true*. It is like the skeptical solutions in that it agrees that the dilemma posed by the apparent conflict between the status-dependence of discursive normative attitudes and the attitude-dependence of discursive norms cannot be resolved in terms articulated according to the traditional modern philosophical metaconcepts of *Verstand*, but only if we shift to thinking about truth and determinateness according to the philosophical metaconcepts of *Vernunft*. In any case, insofar as Hegel's counts for this reason as a skeptical response, it is a *very* different one from the proposal Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, of replacing talk of truth conditions with talk of assertibility conditions.

I think there are good and sufficient reasons to doubt that Wittgenstein endorses the response Kripke suggests for him. And though Wittgenstein points out many of the raw materials Hegel deploys in his account, I do not think he does or would endorse the detailed, theoretically ambitious, constructive metaphysics of normativity Hegel develops by assembling and processing them as he does. But at the level of abstraction at which I have described it, using the terms I propose for understanding Hegel's, I think Kripke is right to see Wittgenstein in effect as centrally concerned with the difficulty of reconciling commitment to the status-dependence of discursive normative attitudes with commitment to the attitude-dependence of discursive normative statuses. And I take it that, like Hegel, Wittgenstein thinks it is absolutely essential to appreciate both of these apparently incompatible but actually complementary aspects of discursive social practices.

Wittgenstein clearly did—as far as can be told, independently—recover the Kantian insight into the fundamentally normative character of intentionality. He understands that being in an intentional state, such as having a belief or an intention, includes having a kind of normative status. For it involves *committing* oneself as to how things are or are to be. In believing or intending one essentially makes oneself liable to normative assessments of the correctness of the belief or the success of the intention. And he is interested in a certain kind of puzzlement we might have about the nature of that normative significance. How are we to understand the way intentional states as it were reach out to various possible states of affairs and sort them into those that are and those that are not in accord with the content of the state?

Someone says to me: "Show the children a game." I teach them gambling with

dice, and the other says "I didn't mean that sort of game." Must the exclusion of

the game with dice have come before his mind when he gave me the order?[3]

The thought is that the retrospective claim about what was meant, intended, ordered, or requested

is quite correct: she did *not* mean that kind of game. But what, exactly, does that fact consist in?

We might find ourselves puzzled about this normative significance, as about how a sign-post

("considered just as a piece of wood") can show us the right way to go.

This question is the first move that sets up the problematic of Kripke's Wittgenstein. But

Wittgenstein has concerns broader than those that show up there—concerns that also articulate the alienation characteristic of

modern metaphysics of normativity. Wittgenstein's preoccupation with processes and practices of *learning* language games is

often remarked upon. Less often noticed, but at least equally central to his thought are the processes and practices of *extending* a

familiar language game to a novel one. Indeed, it is not too strong to say that he takes the way in which an extended language

game can grow out of a more restricted one to be the most central and essential discursive phenomenon. For instance, this

protean, self-transformative power of discursive practices is the basis for his diagnosis of distinctively metaphysical puzzles.

Suppose, he suggests, we had only ever talked about spatial things being "in" one another, but it turned out we could learn not

only to talk about having gold in our teeth, but also having pain in our teeth. If we can all catch on to the new way of talking,

which is "based on" the old only in the sense that only those who already know how to engage in the prior practice can learn to

engage in the extended one, then the new practice need not be in any way problematic in its own terms. But certain questions

that were intelligible before the extension are not intelligible afterwards. It makes sense to ask where the gold was before it was

in my tooth, and where it will be afterwards. But it makes no sense to ask that about the pain in my tooth. Metaphysical worries

arise when a picture that works for the old practice doesn't apply to the new one that grows out of it.

More deeply, it is for this reason, I think, that he is pessimistic about the prospects for systematic semantic theorizing

about language—the project of associating meanings with expressions in such a way that even the most basic proprieties of their

use could be systematically computed from those meanings. For even if one could achieve such a codification, it would hold at

most for a brief time-slice of the evolving and developing language, liable to falsification by the next transformative extension. It

is because it is at every stage the product of a multifarious process of organic growth that language is at every stage in its

development a "motley"—a messy, unsurveyable assemblage of suburbs that have grown out of adjoining regions without a

central downtown.[4] If some community had only ever used proper names for people, it would always have made sense to ask

about anything that had a proper name who its mother and father were. But once community members started using proper

names for, say, rivers, mountains, and stars, that feature of the grammar of proper names would go by the board. Or, if they had

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[3] *Philosophical Investigations* §70.

[4] *PI* §18: "…ask yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before the symbolism of
chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak,
suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?)
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of
houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight
regularstreets and uniform houses."

clung to it, it would be at the cost of metamorphosis of the concepts expressed by "mother" and "father" comparable to that undergone by "in" in the previous example. And things could have gone either way.

Indeed, it seems to be the *contingency* of the budding and sprouting course of development of discursive practices that matters most to Wittgenstein. What developments of a practice take place depends to begin with on what extensions practitioners can catch on to, so that they practically agree about "how to go on" in new cases. These can turn on quirks of embodiment, large and small. ("If a lion could talk, we could not understand him."[5]) But what extensions are in this sense practically possible for a community can also depend on the details of the forms of life they already share and can learn and teach each other to project to new situations. Whether a particular local projection of one practice into another that people *could* learn actually takes place also depends on which among all the practically possible candidates in fact arise, and which of those happen to catch on in the community. The observation motivating this line of thought is that if any of these contingent matters of fact *had* been different, the contents of our concepts, and hence the norms we bind ourselves to by using them in thought and judgment *would* be different.

One lesson illustrated and reinforced by many of Wittgenstein's anecdotes is that the matters of fact (of quite various kinds) on which the boundaries of the norms that govern various expressions are subjunctively and counterfactually dependent are *contingent* in the sense that they could have been different—some features of our embodiment and the history of our practices more easily, and others less easily.

A foreseeable consequence of appreciating these contingencies conditioning our practices is a **delegitimizing of the norms whose contingency has been revealed**.
This undercutting of the rational bindingness of the norms is alienation in Hegel's sense. A familiar example of this general phenomenon happens when a young one realizes that the religious commitments she has always taken for granted are as they are because of the community she was born into—that she is a Baptist because her parents and everyone they know are Baptists, and that had they all instead been Unitarians, Buddhists, or Muslims, she would have been, too.

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[5] *PI* II XI, p. 225.

Realizing the contingencies on which her commitments are counterfactually dependent has the effect of bringing into question their justification, and so their normative force. What is the warrant for taking seriously the claim of those norms, for practically treating them as binding, once the accidental character of the standard for assessment they provide has been revealed?

Pointing to the radical contingencies that our conceptual norms are subjunctively dependent upon poses a threat to our understanding of those norms as *rationally binding* on us. The challenge is to see why, if the norms are to this extent and in this way our products, they can nonetheless be understood to be binding on us, to be *correctly* used this way and not that. How can conceptual norms provide us with *reasons* to apply them one way rather than another, given their counterfactual dependence on contingencies that do *not* provide reasons for the *contents* of those norms to be as they are, rather than some other way?

Genealogy:

The legitimation problem is not just that there are true counterfactuals to the effect that if some contingent fact had been different, the content of the norm in question would have been different. It is that those counterfactuals codify the dependence of the attitude of, for instance, believ*ing* (acknowledging or undertaking a doxastic commitment) on the occurrence of events that do not provide reasons or evidence justifying the content believ*ed*. That the believer was born into a Baptist community is not evidence for the truth of their distinctive theological claims. This is the structure that underlies the delegitimizing force of genealogical explanations generally.

The great unmaskers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud all told stories of this shape. If one's approval of treating labor as a commodity is due to one's bourgeois upbringing, if one's Christian humility is the result of *ressentiment*, if one's authoritarianism should be understood as stemming from unresolved conflicts left over from the Family Romance, then the justifiability and hence the normative force of those commitments is challenged.

For being raised in bourgeois circumstances is not evidence for the justice of labor markets, being riven with *ressentiment* does not provide *reasons* for esteeming humility, and Oedipal rivalry with one's father does not justify adopting authoritarian attitudes. Genealogies point to causes of attitudes that are contingent relative to the norms articulating the contents of

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the concepts, showing them to be as they are because of those contingencies, in the sense that these conditions and the occurrence of these events do not provide *reasons* for applying the concepts one way rather than another. They do not provide *evidence* that could be appealed to in *justifying* the application or withholding of the application of the concept in particular cases

I think Wittgenstein's thought in this area begins with appreciation of the contingency of important aspects of our discursive practices. We inherit ways of using expressions that both are essential to their meaning what they do and show on their surfaces the marks of the contingencies that have shaped them. We find ourselves always already "thrown into" such a situation, and have no choice but to conduct our practical and theoretical discursive affairs against that in many ways arbitrary background. This fact might be called "semantic *Geworfenheit*," to use a Heideggerian metaphor. I think Wittgenstein both thinks that semantic *Geworfenheit* threatens our sense of the norms our discursive practices institute as rationally binding on us, in the sense of providing genuine *reasons* for applying expressions the way we do in novel cases (that is, that it is alienating), and diagnoses this threat as resulting from a residual misunderstanding of the discursive norms that articulate what is a reason for what.[6] In particular, I think he objects to the way of thinking about the division of labor between *instituting* discursive norms and *applying* them that is implicit in seeing semantic *Geworfenheit* as threatening the intelligibility of understanding those discursive norms as governing our practice, in the sense of exercising authority that is genuinely binding on (sets a standard of correctness for assessments of) future uses.

The use of expressions, applying them in some circumstances and withholding application in others, is all there is to institute the norms that govern such applications. The contingencies that turn out to be inherent in our adoption of normative attitudes are essential to their having the determinate contents they do.

Any picture of discursive norms as answering to norms that are rational in a sense that excludes genealogical contingencies is an idealized fantasy, visible as such by its precluding the determinate contentfulness of those norms.

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[6] I grant that "rational normative bindingness" and "conceptual content" are not Wittgensteinian phrases: not ones he uses, or even would approve of the use of. In particular, I think he would object to the adjective "rational" in this context.   Nonetheless, I think the principal points he is making are best put in these terms, at least if we want to bring them into conversation with Hegel's treatment of cognate issues.

I take it that Wittgenstein is concerned both to point out our semantic *Geworfenheit*, and to show that it ought not to be understood as impugning the integrity of discursive norms, since it is essential to their determinate contentfulness. If we are to talk at all, we have no choice but to do so by engaging in practices whose implicit norms are as they are as a result of contingent facts that don't *justify* talking as we do. (As to the alternative, recall Sellars's dictum "Clearly human beings could dispense with all discourse, though only at the expense of having nothing to say."[7]) **Any account of discursive normativity that treats the fact of our semantic *Geworfenheit* as undercutting the legitimacy of those norms (that is, any alienating account), is to be rejected as incorporating an evidently mistaken metaphysics of normativity.** The proper response to this realization, Wittgenstein thinks, is not to construct some alternative positive metaphysical story, but simply to acknowledge and embrace discursive contingency and semantic *Geworfenheit*. We might call this recommended therapeutic meta-attitude "semantic *Gelassenheit*," to continue the Heideggerian metaphor. (Though so used, the term owes more to Meister Eckhart's original usage than to Heidegger's radical adaptation of it.) Basically, it recommends that we just get used to our *Geworfenheit*, rejecting theories according to which it is alienating, without adopting others in their stead.

According to this line of thought, the culprit responsible for the threat of alienation from the discursive norms that make our thought possible is outmoded metaphysical pictures of what would be required to justify those norms, to show them to be genuinely binding on us, to provide suitable standards for assessing the correctness of our attitudes. Rather than holding our practice up to Procrustean standards provided by *a priori* models of what rationality must be like— requiring for instance that reasons have the form of deductive derivations from noncontingent premises, or that they maximize utility in the light of subjective preferences and credences—we should accept that our discursive practices are in order as they are, and understand justification in terms of those semantogenic practices. So understood, the recommended *Gelassenheit* is a kind of pragmatism, in the sense of investing authority in our reason-giving practices, and taking our theories to be responsible to them, rather than the other way around.

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[7] "A Semantical Solution to the Mind-Body Problem," in *Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds,* ed. Jeffrey Sicha (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1980), p. 152.

Hegel anticipated Wittgenstein's social-practical understanding of discursive normativity. That is how he brings Kant's insight into the normativity of intentionality down to earth—in a suitably broad sense *naturalizing* it. And he foresaw the danger that appreciation of our normative semantic *Geworfenheit* poses for the intelligibility of discursive norms as genuinely binding on the attitudes of those who engage in practices of applying those norms. I have been claiming that that is the core of his concept of <u>alienation</u>: that the modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses (a matter of how discursive norms are instituted) undercuts the traditional *sittlich* practical appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes (a matter of how discursive norms are applied). Hegel, too, rejects the conclusion that there is an ineluctable incompatibility here, and so rejects any and every metaphysics of discursive normativity that entails such an incompatibility. For him, these are accounts that operate with the concepts construed according to the categories of *Verstand*, which Kant brought to explicit flowering.

One diagnosis he offers is that in Kant's hands the distinction between reasons and causes (articulating the overarching distinction between the normative and the natural) has been regimented and rigidified into a dualism.
In particular, it is of the first importance to Hegel that the contingent causes on which genealogical analyses show our discursive norms to be counterfactually conditioned are themselves features of prior applications of concepts. **In striking contrast to Wittgenstein's version of normative semantic *Gelassenheit* as theoretical quietism, Hegel offers a detailed systematic account of the process by which and in which actual, and therefore contingent, applications of concepts both institute norms governing such applications and acknowledge the authority of those norms**.

The main point of the *Phenomenology* as I read it is to teach us about how conceptual contents, the norms that articulate truth, are determined by the process that is the experience of error. It is that understanding, replacing the categories of *Verstand* with those of *Vernunft*, that permits us to overcome alienation by showing us in **detail how to reconcile modern appreciation of the**

attitude-dependence of normative statuses with the *sittlich* appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes.

Hegel moves beyond the strategy of overcoming alienation by embracing semantic *Gelassenheit* to offer a detailed systematic account of the process that institutes, articulates, and sustains the reciprocal attitude-dependence of normative statuses and status-dependence of normative attitudes.

Conclusion:

In closing I would like to remind you of two dimensions of Hegel's story that I have *not* rehearsed here ("So much Being, so little Time").

1.   I have talked about the relation between practical normative *attitudes*, which as actually adopted are in the causal order, both causally *elicited* and causally *efficacious*, on the one hand, and *norms* or normative *statuses*, on the other. The historically biperspectival account in terms of recollective rationality shows how the relations are established and developed between the genealogical antecedents and causal *sequelae* of attitudes, expressed in alethic modal vocabulary, and the statuses of authority and responsibility (independence and dependence), expressed in deontic normative vocabulary. This is what I talk about in the book under the heading of the *conceptual idealism* that ultimately makes intelligible the bimodal hylomorphic *conceptual realism* that I talked about already in connection with Hegel's *Introduction*.
The fact that some empirical cognitive attitudes, perceptual judgments, are reliably differentially responsively elicited by features of the environments of discursive subjects—a fact that has no direct analogue in the jurisprudential model—is crucially important in the process of shaping and determining the contents of empirical and practical concepts. It is what makes possible the subjunctively robust tracking by normative discursive attitudes of objective states of affairs.

2.   Relatedly, I have not talked here about Hegel's expressive account of *representation*. It, too, is an aspect of the underlying story about normative statuses and attitudes.
The connections between the two stories are established by two further moves, both of which we have talked about earlier in the course. These are:
   a) A *normative* understanding of specifically *representational* relations, according to which something counts as a representing *of* something else just in case the represented thing

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exercises a distinctive kind of *authority* over representings of it, serving as a standard for normative assessments of their correctness *as* representings. And

b) Hegel's distinctive version of both Frege's sense/reference distinction and the traditional appearance/reality distinction. In accordance with his conceptual realism, both sides of these distinctions are understood to be in conceptual shape, to be forms that conceptual contents can take. Accordingly, cumulative, expressively progressive sequences of discursive attitudes, revealed retrospectively by recollection, are intelligible as successive, increasingly accurate appearances of the reality that finally is revealed (made explicit) as having been implicit all along, or, equivalently, as successive, increasingly accurate representings of the represented object or situation that recollection unveils.